Introduction 1
The processes involved in water supply and wastewater treatment are now largely 2 automated and demand very high quality control. These processes are also subject to 3 environmental and productivity constraints. All stages must be regulated and monitored creating 4 an immensely large volume of information that must be processed. Failing to process this 5 information, such as missing alarms arising from operation abnormalities, can result in 6 inadequate treatment of potable water which threatens public health, and wastewater overflows 7 from wastewater pumping stations (WWPS) which pollute the environment. Northern Ireland 8 (NI) Water has the responsibility to meet the water requirements for NI without detrimentally 9 affecting the environment. Therefore, telemetry, the capacity of capturing, processing and 10 sending system data via radio signal or telephone line, is becoming increasingly important as 11 populations and water stations expand (Avlonitis et al., 2007; Boquete et al., 2003; Gray, 2005; 12 Glasgow et al., 2004; Schneider Electric UK, 2013) . Telemetric supervisory control and data 13 acquisition (SCADA) systems are used by industries to collect and process data from their assets 14 to ensure optimum process efficiency. The most critical function of any SCADA system is to be 15 capable of producing alarms that serve to notify telemetry control operators (TCO) of abnormal 16 process conditions or equipment malfunctions.
17
Nuisance alarms are alarms that do not require a response from the operator. They 18 annunciate excessively and unnecessarily, and do not return to normal after the correct response 19 is taken (EEMUA, 2013) . Sources of nuisance alarms include instrument problems (faulty 20 sensors, etc.), poor control, or poor tuning of alarm settings. The magnitude of these problems 21 may vary depending on what alarm philosophy is used at the onset of the SCADA system 22 development; however, typically for industries that require telemetry control systems, such as 23 4 power plants, they can account for 50% of alarm annunciations (Patel, 2011) .
1 Persistence or ON-delay is the amount of time a signal is allowed to exceed an alarm trip 2 point before an alarm is generated (Hollifield and Habibi, 2011; Northumbrian Water, 2009) . For 3 example, a persistence of 1 minute would mean an alarm signal would have to be in alarm or 4 above the alarm threshold for 1 minute for the alarm to appear or annunciate on TCO screens 5 ( Figure 1 ). Persistence can be useful for preventing recurring nuisance alarms from annunciating 6 (appearing on TCO screens) that otherwise could require increased logic or site visits and 7 maintenance to mitigate. Therefore, most sensors available to water authorities already have 8 built-in persistence (Schneider Electric, 2013) . However, the length of persistence used also adds 9 to the response time for genuine alarms, decreasing response efficiency and increasing risk. The 10 factors that determine this risk are the length of persistence and the sensitivity of the point at 11 which persistence is applied. Therefore, persistence is a double-edged sword; it will reduce 12 alarms, but if used inappropriately, it will increase risk. The ON-delay was the alarm 13 management tool selected for this project. The aim of this study was to carry out alarm duration 14 analysis to determine the appropriate length of persistence that could be applied. 
Materials and Methods

17
The NI Water telemetry control system is configured to remotely monitor approximately 18 60 000 operational assets or points across NI ( Figure 2 ). Many of these points have a single or a 19 multiple alarm setting configuration. When the alarm thresholds are breached, an alarm is 20 received in the telemetry control center (TCC). During this study, an average of 40 000 alarms 21 were received in NI Water's two TCCs per week. This represents a risk to NI Water and is not 22 compatible with the principles of alarm management as described by the International Society of Persistence. At the start of this project, persistence was already in use on some NI Water 3 points. Notably, a 30-minute persistence was placed on WWPSs because they were responsible 4 for a high volume of alarms produced in the water stations. However, before this project, 5 determining the all-important length of persistence to be used for NI Water applications has 6 generally been trial and error, based on the experience of the operators involved, and with no 7 detailed analysis carried out to support the length of persistence chosen. To determine which 8 persistence would be most appropriate, analysis was carried out on alarms that occurred from the 9 weeks starting on November 18 and 25 during 2012 and May 12, May 19, June 2, and June 16 10 during 2013 to attain results that better represented yearly (seasonal) change of alarm patterns.
11
Alarm Analysis Procedure. Alarm data were downloaded from TelemWeb (NI Water's 12 telemetry monitoring system) with the use of system-based filters so only appropiate data were 13 collected. This was then clipboarded and pasted into Excel 2010 ( Figure 3 ). The duration of 14 alarms was calculated by subtracting the time of the first "Raised" state (when alarm first 15 annunciates; i.e., appears on TCO screens) from the subsequent "Cleared" (alarm returns to 16 normal) state for any alarm occurrence. The results were then sorted into time based groups (<5 17 minutes, 5 to 10 minutes, 10 to 20 minutes, 20 to 30 minutes, and >30 minutes) counting each 18 calculation based on its time group.
19
However, because one point can have several alarm thresholds configured (i.e., different 20 alarms for different levels of a tank), it is possible that one point can produce several "Raised" 21 alarm states before it "Clears". In other words, a single point may produce several alarms before 22 returning to normal and clearing. Regardless of how many "Raised" states, there will only be one increases the number of alarms from WWPSs. Analysis carried out from January to March at the 20 onset of the project, previous to the sampling period for the alarm duration analysis, indicated 21 that WWPSs were the second highest producers of alarms with water resource recovery facilities 22 (WRRFs) as the highest offender. Water resource recovery facilities worldwide are notorious for 23 7 poor data quality and sensor malfunctions resulting from the harsh conditions associated with 1 wastewater (Yoo et al., 2008) . Because overflows at WWPSs are more damaging to the 2 environment than overflows at WRRFs, WWPSs are fitted with various sensors with more alarm 3 states such as high, very high, and overflowing (DPIWE, 1999) . The vast majority of alarms 4 generated from the wastewater assets are during wet weather because wet-well levels fluctuate 5 greatly with each downpour (Dieu, 2001) . The alarm settings on these points do not take into 6 account the fluctuating nature of these assets producing numerous fleeting or short-lasting 7 alarms. This is why the greatest portion of alarms in November were <5 minutes, with 57 and 8 77% of total alarms occurring in the weeks of November 18 and 25, respectively. The number of 9 <5-minute alarms were also highest (44 to 53%) for the weeks measured in May and June 2013, 10 compared to longer durations. The alarms that occur under the other time ranges (i.e., 5 to10 11 minutes, 10 to 20 minutes, 20 to 30 minutes, and >30 minutes) were random, with no specific 12 type of alarm associated with a specific time range. The >30-minute alarms were the next highest 13 group ranging from 12 to 31%. Seasonally, there was very little difference within the 5 to 10-14 minute and 10 to 20-minute alarms and between those ranges. These alarms ranged from 5 to 15 11% for 5 to 10 minutes and 3 to 10% for 10 to 20 minutes. The lowest number of alarms 16 occurred for 20 to 30 minutes, with little variation between the weeks measured.
17
Nuisance Alarms. During this study, an average of 50 000 alarms were being generated 18 by the telemetry systems each week, while an average of 40 000 of these alarms would be 19 received in NI Water's two TCCs. These alarms would have to be dealt with by TCOs. Overall, 20 the average percentage of alarms that were <5 minutes was 57%, representing an average of 26 However, a concern expressed during the development of the persistence proposal was 10 the loss of information from points as a result of persistence. This is because persistence is 11 applied at outstations (i.e., service reservoirs), as opposed to the TCC where information from 12 points is passed onto TCO screens and stored for record-keeping purposes and alarm analysis.
13
Any alarm with a duration less than the length of persistence will be prevented at the outstation 14 as described before. Not only is the alarm stopped from annunciating on TCO screens, but no 15 record of the prevented alarm occurring is sent to the TCC. For instance, if the 5-minute 16 persistence was implemented, there would be no indication of points going into alarm for only 4 17 minutes and the record of these suppressed alarms would be lost. This information is important 18 for organizing maintenance schedules, because logical points that are producing abnormally high 19 alarms are probably the result of faulty sensors et cetera, ; therefore, they should be given 20 priority to be corrected as soon as possible (Hollifield and Habibi, 2011; Stauffer, 2012) . advanced alarm management tool available to NI Water, was considered ( Figure 6 ). As described 23 9 by Schneider Electric UK (2013), normally alarms are passed on from the outstation to the 1 master station located within the TCC to TCO monitoring screens, which are also located within 2 the TCC. However, redirection is applied at the master station, also located within the TCC, and 3 can be used to redirect alarms from the master station to TCO computer screens. In this case, 4 when an alarm reaches the master station, the SCADA system can wait for any time delay to 5 expire before redirecting the alarm to TCO screens. If this time delay was 5 minutes, this form of 6 redirection would have the same effect of 5-minute persistence (preventing 5-minute alarms from 7 anunciating on TCO screens), except all alarms regardless of duration would be crucially 8 traveling to the TCC for recording (Hollifield and Habibi, 2011; Schneider Electric UK, 2013) .  Telemetry technicians should be required to keep a spreadsheet detailing the length of 14 persistence that has been added to all assets and continually update the spreadsheet if 15 subsequent persistence is deemed necessary. This should prevent using persistence 16 inappropriately on assets that already have had persistence applied, such as applying 5-17 minute persistence on an asset that has already had 1-hour persistence applied in the past.
18
 The alarm management team should engage asset operators and field managers involved 19 in assets targeted by the alarm management team before applying persistence. This 20 should ensure that inappropriate lengths of persistence are not applied to critical assets, 21 assets with health and safety concerns, or assets in which persistence or redirection are 22 not appropriate due to the nature of the processes involved.
23
 Any implementations of persistence/redirection should be audited. The assets affected 1 should be monitored and evaluated to ensure that the applied persistence is having the 2 desired effect of reducing nuisance alarms and is not detrimentally affecting the processes 3 involved. The ISA alarm management life cycle structure is a good guide (ANSI/ISA, 4 2009) to achieving the above. 
